Jeffrey Sachs on Russia-Ukraine War: U.S. Intervention & NATO Expansion (Critical Analysis)

Sachs believes U.S. interventionism within Russia's sphere of control caused the Ukraine/Russia war

Feb 26, 2025

Earlier in the year I listened to the “All-In Summit 2024” talk featuring Jeffrey Sachs and John Mearsheimer. The discussion focused on U.S. foreign policy, influence of the “Deep State,” and geopolitical tensions involving the likes of China, Ukraine, Russia, India, and the Middle East.

For this piece, I want to focus on Sachs’ perspective on Russia/Ukraine (rather than his entire macro perspective on U.S. foreign policy). In brief, Sachs believes that U.S. intervention and NATO expansion provoked the Russia/Ukraine war — and that had the U.S. just “stayed in their lane” (i.e. showed some restraint) there would be no war.

Sachs provides a smart and clearheaded albeit unique/atypical perspective on Russia/Ukraine and U.S. foreign policy that is worth a listen. That said, we should still think critically about his claims (some of which can be countered/contested) rather than assuming he’s correct.

I. Who Is Jeffrey Sachs?

Jeffrey D. Sachs is a well-known American economist with a multi-decade career that spans:

Shock Therapy in Post-Communist States: Sachs rose to prominence in the late 1980s and early 1990s by advising countries like Bolivia, Poland, and Russia on rapid market reforms. During his time in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, he witnessed firsthand both the enormous upheaval of transitioning economies and the interplay of Western financial institutions with nascent post-Communist governments.
Global Development & Poverty Reduction: In the 2000s, he pivoted toward sustainable development and public health. He led the Earth Institute at Columbia University and became a major proponent of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (later Sustainable Development Goals). This background grounded him in multilateral cooperation and long-term planning for international crises.
Recent Shift to Foreign Policy Critique: Over the past decade, Sachs has become a vocal critic of U.S. military interventions, from the Middle East to Eastern Europe. He argues that an entrenched policymaking establishment—often termed the “deep state”—drives the U.S. to continually expand its strategic footprint around the globe, often with little regard for regional complexities or long-term blowback.

Why His View on Ukraine–Russia Stands Out

Many in Western media generally portray the Russia–Ukraine war as an unprovoked act of aggression by Moscow.

Sachs, however, focuses heavily on the West’s role in provoking Russia, citing decades of NATO enlargement, regime-change tactics, and disregard for Russian security fears.

This contrarian stance aligns him with some prominent “realist” scholars, yet he goes further than most in suggesting the U.S. all but forced Russia’s hand.

II. Sachs’s Framework for the Russia-Ukraine War

A.) Multipolar Spheres of Influence:

Sachs contends that despite America’s post–Cold War dominance, the world is reverting to a multipolar system wherein major powers—particularly the U.S., China, and Russia—carve out their own spheres of influence.
He argues U.S. policymakers reject this naturally evolving multipolarity, instead pursuing an outdated vision of unilateral hegemony.

B.) The “Deep State” and Bipartisan Consensus:

In Sachs’s telling, officials like Victoria Nuland exemplify how career policymakers serve under multiple administrations, both Democratic and Republican, perpetuating the same pro-intervention or expansionist foreign policy.
Thus, he believes there is no meaningful partisan divide: a constant impetus toward U.S. primacy overrides other considerations.

C.) U.S. “Hard Power” vs. Other States’ Interests:

Sachs sees American foreign policy as deeply militarized: reliant on building alliances like NATO, stationing troops abroad, selling arms to allies, and sanctioning adversaries.
In this view, Washington’s willingness to apply economic or military pressure fuels a sense among rival powers (notably Russia) that the U.S. aspires to global dominance rather than genuine co-existence.

III. Chain of Events Leading to the Russia–Ukraine War, According to Sachs

At the heart of Sachs’s explanation is a chronological narrative of provocations, missed diplomatic opportunities, and eventual escalation.

A.) The Primacy of NATO Expansion

Origins in the 1990s

Post–Cold War, President Bill Clinton’s administration initially promoted NATO’s eastward enlargement, starting with former Warsaw Pact states (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic) in 1999.
Sachs cites Russian leaders—Boris Yeltsin, then Vladimir Putin—complaining that NATO expansion violated tacit or explicit promises made during the early 1990s (e.g., the “not one inch eastward” statement attributed to Secretary of State James Baker in 1990).

Key Flashpoint: 2008 Bucharest Summit

At this summit, NATO leaders declared that “Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO.” Although no immediate membership timetable was set, Sachs sees this as a watershed moment: Russia could no longer dismiss the possibility of NATO troops or infrastructure directly on its border.
He argues the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and later tensions in Ukraine cannot be separated from that pledge.

Steady Encroachment Perceived by Moscow

Even if Ukraine’s actual membership was far off, Sachs stresses that Western advisors, training missions, arms shipments, and intelligence cooperation in subsequent years convinced Putin that NATO’s presence in Ukraine was de facto forming.

B.) The 2014 Euromaidan and U.S.-Backed “Coup”

Yanukovych’s Fall

Sachs characterizes the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 as a turning point. Official Western narrative: it was a popular revolution fueled by Ukrainians’ desire for an EU association agreement and an end to corruption.
Sachs, however, labels it a Western-engineered “coup” that installed a pro-NATO government in Kyiv. In his narrative, Washington’s involvement was decisive in ensuring Yanukovych’s removal and subsequent alignment with Euro-Atlantic structures.

Immediate Russian Reaction

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in the Donbas shortly thereafter, according to Sachs, must be viewed as Moscow’s countermove to prevent Ukraine from definitively joining NATO.
He references phone calls and statements from U.S. officials (like the infamous leaked Victoria Nuland conversation about shaping Kyiv’s government) as proof that the West effectively orchestrated regime change.

Disconnect on Democracy

Where many Western commentators celebrate the Euromaidan protests as a democratic uprising, Sachs sees it as part of a broader pattern of U.S. meddling under the guise of democracy promotion—reminiscent of interventions in the Middle East or earlier “color revolutions.”

C.) The 2022 Full-Scale Invasion as “Inevitable” Blowback

Increased Military Aid to Ukraine (2014–2022)

From 2014 onward, Ukraine received significant Western military assistance and began closer cooperation with NATO short of full membership.
Sachs underscores that Russia repeatedly warned it would not tolerate a heavily armed Ukraine aligned with NATO at its western border.

Diplomatic Failures

Sachs argues that U.S. administrations (Obama, Trump, Biden) refused to recognize Russia’s declared red lines: that Ukraine must not become a NATO outpost.
He often cites the 2021–2022 period, when Moscow made explicit security proposals—like rolling NATO deployments back to 1997 lines—that were rejected or not seriously negotiated.

Putin’s Calculation

By late 2021, in Sachs’s telling, Putin believed Washington was forging a de facto military alliance with Ukraine.
Hence, he launched a pre-emptive invasion in February 2022, convinced that diplomacy had failed and that NATO’s eastward march (with Ukraine as a frontline) had to be forcibly halted.

IV. Why Sachs Sees U.S. Policy as Driven by a “Deep State” Imperative

A.) Bi-Partisan Interventionism

Many of the same policymakers—he often names Victoria Nuland as a prime example—served in multiple administrations, from Bill Clinton to George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden.
This continuity, Sachs claims, indicates a fixed strategic aim of pushing U.S. influence globally, regardless of which party holds the White House.

B.) Prior Examples of Regime Change

Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), and attempted overthrows in Syria (2011–present) form the background context for Sachs’s argument.
He believes the U.S. uses moral narratives (defending democracy, human rights) as pretexts while actually seeking strategic advantage—coaxing or installing governments sympathetic to Washington’s geopolitical goals.

C.) Extra-Legal or Covert Actions

Sachs points to intelligence operations, funding for opposition groups, and covert support for “friendly” actors.
He sees these as routine policy tools employed to shape foreign governments—tools that eventually targeted Ukraine.

V. The Nuclear Danger: Sachs’s Pivotal Concern

Although Sachs elaborates on the 2014 revolution and 2022 invasion as outcomes of Western encroachment, his most urgent theme is the catastrophic risk of nuclear war:

Parallel to the Cuban Missile Crisis: Sachs frequently cites 1962, when the U.S. nearly came to blows with the USSR over missiles in Cuba. In his interpretation, just as the U.S. would not abide Soviet weapons 90 miles from Florida, Russia will not abide NATO buildup in Ukraine.
Risks of Escalation: With Western weapons pouring into Ukraine, Sachs warns a direct NATO–Russia conflict could erupt, either by accident or by miscalculation, and quickly climb the ladder of nuclear escalation.
Necessity of Diplomatic Settlement: Sachs calls repeatedly for immediate negotiations that confirm Ukraine’s neutral status (i.e., no NATO membership) and address Russia’s security demands. He sees this as the only reliable way to avoid potential nuclear catastrophe—a risk he argues Washington is not taking seriously enough.

VI. Sachs’s “Solution” to the Russia-Ukraine War

Based on his takes, Sachs’s recommended strategy for resolving the Russia-Ukraine war is likely something along the lines of what’s below.

Ceasefire and Neutrality: He wants an immediate halt to hostilities, with Ukraine promising not to join NATO. Russia would presumably halt its invasion and retract or freeze positions (though Sachs is less explicit on whether that includes returning all occupied territory).
Recognition of Russia’s Security Interests: According to Sachs, the West needs to formally acknowledge Russia’s “red lines,” effectively forswearing any future attempts to expand NATO into Ukraine or station offensive weapons there.
Heavy Diplomacy Involving All Major Powers: A grand bargain: the U.S., Europe, Russia, and likely China would guarantee Ukraine’s sovereignty and neutrality, while also addressing Russian security concerns about further NATO deployments near its borders.
Post-War Reconstruction: Sachs’s background in development leads him to envision a massive rebuilding of Ukraine, presumably funded by the international community once the conflict ends under a stable diplomatic accord.

VII. Sachs’ Blindspots & Counterarguments (Russia-Ukraine)

Sachs’s perspective — emphasizing NATO expansionism and U.S. interventionism — highlights key potential reasons for the Russia-Ukraine war.

The only problem is that his lens/perspective is highly-specific and omits key details, perhaps for the sake of persuasion/framing.

A.) Neglect of Ukrainian Agency and Sovereignty

Grassroots Nature of Euromaidan

Sachs’s Take: Paints Euromaidan as chiefly a “U.S.-backed coup.”
Counterpoint: While Western officials indeed had interests in Ukraine, Euromaidan was also a large-scale popular protest fueled by frustration with corruption, Yanukovych’s pivot away from an EU association agreement, and years of perceived misgovernance.
Why It Matters: Reducing it to external machinations downplays Ukrainian autonomy, ignoring that millions participated willingly, demanding governance reforms and closer ties with Europe.

Repeated Polling Data

Since 2014, multiple polls indicate growing public support in Ukraine for EU integration—and in many cases, for deeper security cooperation with NATO.
This complicates Sachs’s portrayal of a purely top-down Western push, suggesting widespread bottom-up pro-Western sentiment.

B.) Russia’s Imperial or Revanchist Tendencies

Putin’s Rhetoric on “Historic Russian Lands”

Sachs’s Take: Focuses on Russia’s “defensive” posture.
Counterpoint: Putin has given speeches and written essays questioning Ukraine’s statehood, calling large swaths of its territory essentially Russian. This reflects offensive or revanchist ambitions, not merely defensive anxiety about NATO.
Significance: Explains why Russia’s aggression seems to go beyond deterring NATO; it involves territorial claims and reassertion of a “Russkiy Mir” (Russian World).

Pattern of Interventions

Russia invaded Georgia in 2008—again citing NATO proximity—yet actual membership for Georgia was also distant at that time.
The annexation of Crimea (2014) followed the Budapest Memorandum (1994), in which Russia pledged to respect Ukraine’s borders. Violating that commitment weakens the argument that Russia acts purely “reactively” or is forced by Western moves.

C.) The Nuclear Blackmail Conundrum

Infinite Threats

Sachs’s Concern: The U.S. ignoring Russia’s red lines risks nuclear escalation.
Counterpoint: If any nuclear power can annex neighbors by threatening nukes, it creates a template for unchecked aggression. Eventually, others must show resolve; otherwise, nuclear intimidation sets a global precedent.
Balance: Western leaders must avoid rash escalation but cannot perpetually appease nuclear threats, or international order collapses.

Historical Precedents

The Cuban Missile Crisis showed that firm negotiation backed by credible deterrence can avert disaster. Mutual compromise was achieved, but the U.S. did not cede its entire sphere of influence simply to avoid nuclear war.

D.) Moral and Legal Dimensions of Russia’s Invasion

War Crimes & Atrocities

Sachs’s Take: He focuses primarily on the potential geostrategic root causes (NATO, coups).
Counterpoint: Accounts of atrocities in places like Bucha, Mariupol, and forced deportations highlight a serious humanitarian crisis—one that cannot be dismissed as “defensive.”
Why It Matters: Any holistic analysis must factor in violations of international law and human rights; Sachs’s framework risks seeming to excuse or rationalize these if not addressed.

Ukrainian Sovereignty

Sovereign states (like Ukraine) are entitled to inviolable borders under international law. By emphasizing U.S. meddling, Sachs can seem to gloss over the fact that Russia’s invasion—whatever its triggers—contradicts fundamental legal norms.

E.) The Understated Role of U.S. (and EU) Soft Power

Appeal of Western Institutions

Sachs highlights NATO’s military outreach but seldom acknowledges the pull of EU membership prospects and broader Western integration.
Many Ukrainians, especially younger generations, view the EU and the “Western model” as pathways to economic development and rule of law—factors that cannot be reduced to U.S. regime-change conspiracies.

Autonomous Decision-Making

It was not simply the White House or NATO “forcing” alignment. The Orange Revolution (2004) and Euromaidan (2013–14) each reflected genuine local demands for closer ties to Europe and less corruption—an aspect only tangentially noted in Sachs’s narrative.

Note: Vox Ukraine published an “Open Letter to Jeffrey Sachs” (20 Mar 2023) that addressed Sachs’ takes directly. My counterarguments were relatively similar to theirs: Sachs denies Ukraine’s agency/sovereignty and presents Ukraine as extremely divided (which is misleading).

VIII. Reconciling Sachs’s Claims with Other Evidence

A.) Where Sachs Is Likely Correct

NATO Expansion Was a Provocative Factor: Multiple realists (e.g., John Mearsheimer) warned that pushing NATO to Russia’s borders would eventually trigger a serious confrontation. Sachs is justified in noting that Western leaders undervalued Russia’s objections.
U.S. Interventionism: Sachs rightly points to repeated examples—Libya, Iraq, Syria—where the U.S. used military or covert means to topple regimes or reshape political outcomes. Ukraine has echoes of these tactics, at least at certain junctures (e.g., clandestine support for certain factions).
Nuclear Escalation Risk: His alarm that the war risks escalating into a nuclear standoff is valid. Nuclear powers can stumble into war through miscalculation, and ignoring Russian capabilities is dangerous.

B.) Where Sachs Likely Oversimplifies or Overstates

Downplaying Putin’s Ambitions: By framing Russia as mostly “reactive,” Sachs neglects evidence that territorial expansion and “reunification” with what Moscow sees as historically Russian territory are also active drivers.
Reducing Euromaidan to a “U.S. Coup”: While external influence existed, the protests were overwhelmingly grassroots in nature, fueled by years of discontent with Yanukovych’s corrupt rule.
Ignoring Ukraine’s Popular Support for Western Integration: Sachs emphasizes “U.S. meddling,” but local polling and electoral outcomes consistently show a strong Ukrainian desire for closer ties with Europe—especially after 2014.

IX. Optimal Strategy for the U.S. (Long-Term) on Russia/Ukraine?

From an American standpoint, a prudent long-term approach might integrate the following:

Support Ukraine’s Sovereign Choice

While being mindful of nuclear risks, completely abandoning Ukraine’s defense could set a dangerous precedent for nuclear-armed coercion.
Providing military and economic aid to enable Ukraine to negotiate from a position of relative strength (though short of direct NATO troop involvement) can be a middle path.

Maintain Clear Lines of Communication with Russia

Diplomatic Channels should remain open—even in wartime—to discuss ceasefires, civilian corridor arrangements, or broader settlement frameworks.
Sachs’s call for negotiations is valid; the key is balancing deterrence (to prevent unchecked aggression) with willingness to talk.

Collaborate with Allies and Possibly China

Acting in concert with NATO partners and maintaining a unified front can discourage Russian hopes of fracturing the alliance.
Quietly encouraging China’s role in restraining Russian nuclear threats could be useful, as Beijing has consistently stated that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

Don’t Neglect Soft Power and Post-Conflict Planning

A significant portion of the region’s drift toward the West has been fueled by cultural and economic aspirations (not just anti-Russian sentiment).
If a stable end to the conflict emerges, reconstruction of Ukraine—with an emphasis on anti-corruption measures and institutional reforms—would reduce future vulnerability.

X. Sachs’s Perspective on Ukraine & Russia: Merits & Limitations

Jeffrey Sachs presents a deeply critical take on U.S. policy toward Russia, stressing that NATO expansion and alleged regime-change ambitions in Ukraine created a scenario in which conflict became inevitable.

His emphasis on nuclear risks is a crucial reminder that wars between nuclear powers require extreme caution and diplomacy.

However, Sachs’s analysis has some blindspots:

Ukrainian self-determination, including strong popular pro-EU sentiments.
Putin’s revanchist claims on Ukrainian lands.
Russia’s violation of explicit international commitments (Budapest Memorandum).
Moral consequences of a brutal, large-scale war that involves civilian atrocities and fundamental breaches of sovereignty.

In short, his warnings about Western recklessness and nuclear danger deserve consideration, but his depiction of the war probably over-corrects by casting Russia as more reactive than the evidence suggests, and by underplaying Ukrainian agency.

So what’s the best path for the U.S. going forward? Probably a combo of strong deterrence (preventing Russian expansion via nuclear blackmail) and open diplomatic avenues (avert a nuclear showdown) — while respecting Ukraine’s right to self-determination AND acknowledging that the region’s turn to the West is not solely a product of American meddling, but also a voluntary, legitimate choice by millions of Ukrainians.

ASAP Drew

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